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Wheelchair Ramps in Cyberspace: Bringing the
Americans with Disabilities Act into the 21st
Century
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act 1
to protect disabled individuals from discrimination in a variety of
forms. The Act was designed to provide disabled individuals the
same opportunities that individuals without disabilities enjoy.
Modifications designed to fulfill the Act’s goal of equal access, such
as wheelchair ramps, have become common since the Act was signed
into law; however, many disabled individuals do not have equal
access to the World Wide Web.
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that “No
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.” 2 Some circuit courts
interpret “place of public accommodation” broadly to include
nonphysical places, while other circuit courts interpret this provision
narrowly to require a physical tangible facility—putting virtual places
like websites outside of Title III coverage.
This unresolved circuit split culminated in the summer of 2012
when two nearly identical cases regarding website accessibility were
decided by two different district courts with completely different
outcomes. The issue in both cases was whether the lack of video
subtitles in Netflix’s online streaming library was a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court located in the
Ninth Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act did not
apply to Netflix’s website because the website was not a place of
public accommodation, 3 while the district court located in the First
Circuit held that Netflix’s website was a place of public

1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
3. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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accommodation and therefore subject to the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 4 The decision of the latter court marks the first time
that a federal court has held that a website is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. With this precedent set, website accessibility for
disabled individuals is likely to become a hot topic as any private
website that is not designed to be accessible may now successfully be
sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
This Comment offers a solution to the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s website accessibility problem and the unresolved
circuit split. This solution, called “the storefront test,” extends Title
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to a wide variety of
websites without overstepping the textual bounds of the statute. The
storefront test does not purport to be a substitution for legislation,
but it provides a workable judicial solution that builds upon previous
circuit court decisions without stepping into the realm of judicial
lawmaking. The storefront test proposes the following:
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a
substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical facility
may be subject to Title III if the facility and the website together
form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the
5
enumerated places of public accommodation.

While this test is simple and intuitive enough for easy application
(as well as catchy enough to be remembered), it has enough depth
and utility to be useful in a variety of complex scenarios.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and enactment of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as subsequent legislative
and regulatory developments, and gives an overview of the Internet
and the accessibility challenges the Internet poses for some disabled
individuals. Part III of this Comment analyzes the circuit split on the
issue of whether Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
applies to nonphysical places such as websites, discusses the recent
Netflix decisions, and suggests the split is reconcilable at the circuit
level. Part IV proposes the storefront test as a solution to the circuit
split. Part IV explores the statutory boundaries of the Americans

4. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
5. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act defines “place of public
accommodation” through twelve broad, but exhaustive, categories enumerated in 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7). These categories are discussed in Part II.B.

652

DO NOT DELETE

651

1/29/2014 4:30 PM

Wheelchair Ramps in Cyberspace

with Disabilities Act to ensure that the storefront test provides
maximum protection without exceeding the bounds of the Act. The
storefront test is then analyzed in greater detail and applied in
several different circumstances to demonstrate its practicality and
versatility.
II. BACKGROUND: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
INTERNET
This section discusses the enactment and purpose of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA” or “the Act”) and the title
of the ADA relevant to this discussion—Title III. This section then
gives a brief overview of the history and growth of the Internet,
along with the ways disabled individuals experience website
discrimination. Finally, this section discusses website accessibilityrelated regulations and amendments that were passed subsequent to
the enactment of the ADA.

A. Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
On July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act was signed
into law 6 with overwhelming bipartisan support. 7 The ADA
originated with the National Council on Disability,8 and was largely
modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. 9 The purpose of the Act, codified in 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b), is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3)
to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of

6. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 26, 1990).
7. The ADA passed with a vote of 91–6 in the Senate and 377–28 in the House. 136
CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) (Senate); 136 CONG. REC. 17,296–97 (1990) (House).
8. 135 CONG. REC. S10,790 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dole).
9. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,545 (July 26, 1991); see also Robert L. Burgdorf,
Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 250–51,
285 (2008) (noting that the civil rights movement in the 1960s served as a model for Americans
with disabilities and that language in the ADA was borrowed from the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.

The ADA was intended to be a comprehensive piece of civil
rights legislation 10 that would fully integrate Americans with
disabilities into society. 11 In enacting the ADA, Congress found that
about forty-three million Americans “have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population
as a whole is growing older.” 12 Congress also found that “unlike
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who
have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often
had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.” 13
The ADA has impacted the lives of individuals both with and
without disabilities throughout the nation. According to the
National Council on Disability, the ADA has “begun to transform
the social fabric of our nation,” by changing the way Americans
perceive disabilities and by putting discrimination against disabled
individuals on par with race or gender discrimination. 14 America
continues to accommodate physically impaired individuals with
accessible streets, buildings, sports arenas, and transportation
systems. 15 The ADA has also helped give disabled individuals equal
opportunity in the workplace. 16 Although the ADA provides broad
protection for disabled individuals, there are no express regulations
for website accessibility within the ADA.

10. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 17,031 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (describing the
ADA as a comprehensive and elaborate piece of civil rights legislation).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006); see also Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 249 (noting that
the ultimate objective of civil rights activists—full integration and participation—was endorsed
in the ADA).
12. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(1).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
14. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1 (2000).
15. Senator Tom Harkin, 20 Years of Progress Thanks to the ADA, ABILITY MAG. (June/July
2010), available at http://www.abilitymagazine.com/20th-ADA.html.
16. Id.
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Complaints that a private party’s 17 website violates the ADA are
brought under Title III of the ADA. 18 Title III prohibits
discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.” 19 The ADA differs from other civil rights
legislation—where a place of public accommodation is typically only
prohibited from denying access to its goods or services on the basis of
some characteristic—by requiring places of public accommodation to
affirmatively ensure that individuals with disabilities have equal access
to the goods or services.20 Thus, a place of public accommodation
discriminates against a disabled individual by failing to take
affirmative action to accommodate the individual, such as building a
wheelchair ramp. The ADA provides exceptions if the owner or
operator can show that removing a barrier would not be readily
achievable or that making modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of the goods or services or result in undue burden. 21
Section 12181 of the Act defines a “place of public
accommodation” as a place which affects commerce and falls within
one of twelve enumerated categories. 22 Congress stated its intent

17. Websites operated by public entities are not relevant to this discussion because they
are regulated by the Rehabilitation Act, which sets out specific accessibility guidelines for
websites operated by public entities. 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2006); 36 C.F.R. § 1194.22.
18. See infra discussion Part III.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
20. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 104 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 389 (“These general prohibitions are patterned after the basic, general
prohibitions that exist in other civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination . . . . In order not
to discriminate against people with disabilities, however, certain steps must often be taken as
well in order to ensure that an opportunity for individuals with disabilities to participate in the
goods or services is effective and meaningful.”).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv).
22.
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such
proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
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that these twelve categories be exhaustive, but that the examples
within the categories be illustrative and the catchall phrases at the
end of the examples be construed liberally.23
Congress gave authority to the Attorney General to issue
regulations and carry out Title III as it applies to facilities and
vehicles. 24 Accordingly, the Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “the
Department”) further defined public accommodations as “facilities,”
and stated that a facility includes all portions of a building,
walkways, parking lots, and equipment. 25
To bring a suit under Title III of the ADA, individuals must first
establish that they have a disability 26 and are subject to current
discrimination. 27 Next, the individual must show that the accused
party is a private entity and that the public accommodation affects

sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school,
or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
Id. § 12181(7).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 100 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 383
(“For example, the legislation lists ‘golf course’ as an example under the category of ‘place of
exercise or recreation.’ This does not mean that only driving ranges constitute ‘other similar
establishments.’ Tennis courts, basketball courts, dance halls, playgrounds, and aerobics
facilities . . . are also included in this category.”); see also S. REP. NO. 101-16, at 59 (1989).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).
25. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
26. Disability is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 as a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; a record of such an
impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment, meaning that an individual was
subjected to discrimination based on a perceived disability, whether or not the impairment
limits a major life activity; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)–(i).
27. Schroedel v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp. 594, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“In order to establish an injury in fact necessary to a claim for injunctive relief, the moving
party must demonstrate that a defendant’s conduct is causing irreparable harm. This
requirement cannot be met absent a showing of a real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will
be wronged again.”).
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commerce. 28 The plaintiff then has the burden of establishing a
prima facie case of a violation under Title III. 29 To do so, the plaintiff
must show that the other party owns, leases, or operates a place of
public accommodation 30 that fits under one of the twelve
enumerated categories listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), and that the
plaintiff was denied “the full and equal enjoyment” of the goods or
services on the basis of a disability. 31 Note that Title III only requires
private entities to provide equal access to the goods or services, not to
provide content that is equally enjoyable—for example, a bookstore
may be required to construct a wheelchair ramp providing access to
the books, but it is not required to alter its inventory to stock Braille
books. 32 Next, the plaintiff must show that the proposed
accommodations are reasonable; namely, that they are “readily
achievable,” will not result in “undue burden,” or will not
“fundamentally alter the nature” of the services or goods. 33 The
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove otherwise, and then
back to the plaintiff to rebut the defendant. 34 Plaintiffs bringing suit
under Title III can only request injunctive relief. But if the Attorney
General becomes involved in the suit, the court may award damages
at the Attorney General’s request. 35
Although there are several possible reasons for the original
ADA’s lack of regulations regarding website accessibility, 36 the most
definite reason is that the Internet did not exist as we know it when
the ADA was enacted.37 While the original ADA’s lack of regulations

28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a); see also id. §§ 12101(b)(4), 12181(1)–(2), (6). Note
that public entities are covered under Title II of the ADA. Id. § 12132.
29. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. E*Trade Access, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59–60 (D. Mass.
2006); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1166–67 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also Mayberry, 843 F. Supp. at 1166.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
32. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(i)–(iv); see also Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294
F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
34. See 136 A.L.R. Fed. 1 § 2(b); see also E*Trade, 464 F. Supp. 2d. at 61; Mayberry, 843 F.
Supp. at 1166–67.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2).
36. See infra discussion Part IV.A.
37. In the late 1960s, computers in different locations were connected together to
exchange data for the first time, CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A
CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT 1, 61 (1999), however, “Internet” did not become the
official word to describe the networks that had developed until 1983, id. at 110, when fewer than
1000 computers were connected to the Internet. Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline,
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regarding website accessibility is understandable, the lack of
subsequent legislation or regulations regarding private website
accessibility for the disabled is less understandable. The DOJ has
issued numerous regulations for Title III of the ADA 38 pursuant to
its grant of authority from Congress, 39 but regulations concerning
private website accessibility have yet to be issued. 40 Congress has

ZAKON.ORG, http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline (last updated Dec. 30, 2011) (it is
not until 1984 that the number of hosts breaks 1000). In 1991, the World Wide Web was
invented, along with the first web server, browser, and website. JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT
CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN: THE STORY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 180–203 (2000).
Thus, when the ADA was enacted in 1990, there was no such thing as a website.
38. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.104–36.608.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).
40. In 2010, on the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the ADA, the DOJ issued an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding ADA regulation of web accessibility,
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of
State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460
(proposed July 26, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOJCRT-2010-0005-0001, and President Barack Obama announced that “[e]ven as we speak,
Attorney General Eric Holder is preparing new rules to ensure accessibility of websites.” Remarks
by the President on 20th Anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act, WHITE HOUSE (July 26,
2010,
6:26
PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-20thanniversary-americans-with-disabilities-act. However, in July 2011 the DOJ announced that this
would be a “long-term item” to the disappointment of disability advocates, meaning that it will
be several years before the DOJ promulgates any actual regulation on this issue, if at all.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DOJ SEMIANNUAL REGULATORY AGENDA - FALL 2011, at 86 (Jan. 2012),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOJ-OAG-2012-0001-0001; DOJ
Delays Web Accessibility Regulations, LAW OFFICE OF LAINEY FEINGOLD (July 19, 2011),
http://lflegal.com/2011/07/web-delay/. In 2013, the DOJ website stated that it will issue a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the issue of Title II website accessibility in July 2013 and
Title
III
in
December
2013.
See
OFF.
INFO.
REG.
AFF.,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=1190-AA61 (last
visited
Sept.
8,
2013);
OFF.
INFO.
REG.
AFF.,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=1190-AA65 (last
visited Sept. 8, 2013). But as of the publication of this Comment, the DOJ has failed to issue a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Title II.
Despite the DOJ’s lack of regulations, the Department has issued several statements
regarding its positions on the issue. As early as 1996, Deval Patrick, Assistant Attorney General,
stated in a letter to Senator Harkin—chief sponsor of the ADA in the Senate—the DOJ’s position
that Title III of the ADA applies to websites. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Civil Rights Div., to Senator Tom Harkin, U.S. Senate (Sept. 9, 1996), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/cltr204.txt. The DOJ has also stated that Title III of the ADA
applies to private websites in several amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief for the U.S. Department of
Justice, filed as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Hooks v. OKbridge, 232 F.3d 208 (2000)
(No.
99-50891),
1999
WL
33806215,
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/hooks.pdf; Brief for the U.S. Department of
Justice, filed as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294
F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-111197), 2001 WL 34094038, at *5, available at
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also failed to take legislative action on this issue. In 2000, before any
court had issued a ruling on whether a website is a place of public
accommodation, the House’s Subcommittee on the Constitution
held a hearing regarding the applicability of the ADA to the
Internet. 41 After the hearings, the committee filed a brief House
report merely stating the issues that had been discussed and
recognizing the DOJ’s position on the issue, without expressing an
opinion on the matter. 42 In 2008 Congress amended the ADA as a
result of Supreme Court decisions that had limited the Act’s
breadth.43 Despite Congress’s awareness of the website accessibility
issue—and the development of a circuit split on the issue 44—the
amendments did not mention website accessibility.

B. Internet Accessibility for Americans with Disabilities
Americans with visual impairments—who, according to 2010
census data, number over eight million, two million of which are
blind 45—face the biggest obstacles with regards to website
accessibility and navigation. 46 Individuals with mobility
impairments, deafness, and epilepsy may also experience problems
accessing and navigating websites. 47

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/rendon.pdf. The DOJ has also negotiated
settlements where they required accessibility in nonphysical locations, see, e.g., Enforcing the
ADA: A Status Report from the Department of Justice: April-June 2002, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.ada.gov/aprjun02.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012), and even brought a suit on its
own for a Title III violation involving website inaccessibility. See Enforcing the ADA: A Status
Dec.
2010,
at
4,
available
at
Report
from
the
Department
of
Justice,
http://www.ada.gov/octdec10.pdf.
41. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 65-010 at 19 (2000) (statement of Gary Wunder, Programmer Analyst-Expert, ITSHosp.
Bus.
Apps.,
Univ.
of
Mo.),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65010.000/hju65010_0f.htm.
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-1048, at 275 (2001).
43. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §2, reprinted in 2008
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553.
44. See infra discussion Part III.
45. This number only includes the civilian noninstitutionalized population of America
ages fifteen and older. Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
July 2012, at 4, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf.
46. Kel Smith, The Missing Link: Understanding Web Accessibility, PRAC. LAW., June 2007, at
31, 32, available at http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PL_TPL0706Smith_thumb.pdf (“[T]he term ‘web accessibility’ pertains mainly to the blind.”).
47. See id.; Nina Golden, Access This: Why Institutions of Higher Education Must Provide Access
to the Internet to Students with Disabilities, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 363, 391–92 (2008).
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As websites have become more interactive and richer in
multimedia content, it has become more challenging for some
individuals with disabilities to access the opportunities associated
with this content. 48 To access the Internet, some individuals with
disabilities use assistive hardware and software such as screen
readers. 49 Screen readers convert text into speech so that blind
individuals can listen to web content. 50 Screen readers cannot
discern what an image is depicting, but the web designer can add a
brief description of the image to the underlying code so that the
screen reader can describe the image to the user. 51 To navigate the
website and “click” on links, a blind person may use a keyboard. 52 In
the early days of the Internet, when websites were primarily text
based, blind individuals were able to access and navigate websites
with relative ease. 53 However, as websites grew more sophisticated
and interactive, developers started putting code in places where the
graphic description would normally go, causing the screen reader to
read off an indecipherable list of random words and numbers that
have nothing to do with the image. 54 Bruce Sexton Jr., a plaintiff in
National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., 55 explained that when
he attempted to navigate Target’s website he could not “tell whether
the numbers he hears on other parts of the home page correspond to
products, files or something else.” 56

48. Id.
49. Smith, supra note 46, at 32–33.
50. Visual Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/blind (last visited Dec.
19, 2012); see e.g., JAWS for Windows Screen Reading Software, FREEDOM SCI.,
http://www.freedomscientific.com/products/fs/JAWS-product-page.asp (last visited Dec. 19,
2012).
51. Visual Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/blind (last visited Dec.
19, 2012); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 65-010 at 19 (2000) (statement of Gary Wunder, Programmer Analyst-Expert, ITSHosp.
Bus.
Apps.,
Univ.
of
Mo.),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65010.000/hju65010_0f.htm [hereinafter
Hearings].
52. Visual Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/blind (last visited Dec.
19, 2012).
53. Diane Murley, Web Site Accessibility, 100 LAW LIBR. J. 401, 404 (2008).
54. Id.; Smith, supra note 46.
55. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Discussed infra Part III.B.2.
56. Carol Silwa, Accessibility Issue Comes to a Head, COMPUTERWORLD (May 8, 2006,
12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/111219/
Accessibility_Issue_Comes_to_a_Head.
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Because the text of Title III and its accompanying regulations
appear to limit places of public accommodation to physical places,
plaintiffs have had difficulty bringing claims under Title III against
websites that are not accessible to individuals with disabilities. 57
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS A WEBSITE A PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
UNDER TITLE III OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT?
The idea that networks like the Internet are a “place” was played
around with as early as 1982, where the term “cyberspace” was first
used in a fictional story to describe objects and events taking place
inside a computer network. 58 One author describes cyberspace as
the ‘place’ where a telephone conversation appears to occur. Not
inside your actual phone, the plastic device on your desk. Not
inside the other person’s phone, in some other city. THE PLACE
BETWEEN the phones . . . .
. . . .
. . . [A]nd though there is still no substance to cyberspace, nothing you can
handle, it has a strange kind of physicality now. It makes good sense
today to talk of cyberspace as a place all its own. 59

The cases discussed in this section involve the question of
whether a website—or other nonphysical place—is a place of public
accommodation. Over the last several years, a split has developed in
the circuits on this question, with some circuits interpreting “place
of public accommodation” broadly to include nonphysical places,
while others require a nexus between a nonphysical entity (such as a
website) and an actual physical place. This section first analyzes the
cases and positions of the circuits involved in the split and then
discusses how the circuits’ positions may be reconciled.

57. See infra discussion Part III; see, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198
F.3d 1104, 1114 (2000) (“All the items on this list, however, have something in common. They
are actual, physical places. . . .”).
58. BRUCE STERLING, Introduction to THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/101; Scott Thill, March 17,
WIRED
(Mar.
17,
2009),
1948:
William
Gibson,
Father
of
Cyberspace,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2009/03/dayintech_0317
59. STERLING, Introduction to THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 58.

661

DO NOT DELETE

1/29/2014 4:30 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

A. The Broad View: Title III Is Not Limited to Actual Physical Places
The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits are often cited for taking
the position that a place of public accommodation, as defined under
Title III of the ADA, does not have to be a physical structure. 60
However, these circuit courts have not explicitly held that a website is
a place of public accommodation as this issue has not been brought
before them yet.

1. Places of public accommodation are not limited to physical structures
The issue of whether places of public accommodation must be
actual physical structures was brought to a circuit court for the first
time in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Ass’n of
New England, Inc.61 Carparts involved an employee who was enrolled
in an employer-funded medical reimbursement plan. After the
employee was diagnosed with HIV, the health plan was amended to
limit benefits for AIDS-related illnesses to $25,000. 62 After being
diagnosed with AIDS, the employee 63 brought suit alleging, among
other things, illegal discrimination on the basis of a disability under
Title III of the ADA.
The district court in Carparts dismissed the claim, concluding
that the defendants—the Automotive Wholesalers Association of
New England (who offered the plan) and the plan’s administrating
trust 64—were not liable under Title III because they were not places
of public accommodation. 65 The district court interpreted “places of
public accommodation” as “actual physical structures with definite
physical boundaries which a person physically enters for the purpose
of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services therein” and concluded
that neither the association nor the administrating trust had these
characteristics. 66

60. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
61. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
62. AIDS is a disability under the ADA. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
63. Although the employee died before this suit was resolved, the executors of his estate
were substituted as plaintiffs in this action. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 14 n.1.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id. at 18.
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On appeal, the First Circuit rejected the district court’s
interpretation of Title III and held that the plain meaning of the
statute does not limit public places to physical structures. The court
reasoned that the statute’s inclusion of “travel service[s]” and “other
service establishment[s]” 67 supports the position that Title III does
not require a place of public accommodation to be an actual physical
structure. The court explained that many customers never enter an
office of a travel service because business is often conducted by
telephone or correspondence: “It would be irrational to conclude that
persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the
ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the
telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such
an absurd result.” 68 After holding that a place of public
accommodation is not limited to physical places, the court clarified
that Title III does not regulate the content of the goods or services,
only access to the goods or services.
While Carparts is an oft-cited landmark decision for individuals
seeking to extend Title III protection to cyberspace, it is important to
note that the First Circuit did not hold that the association or its
administrating trust were places of public accommodation but
remanded the case to the district court to make a determination
consistent with the Circuit Court’s interpretation of the statute.69
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit decided Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., another case alleging Title III discrimination by a health
insurance policy that capped benefits for AIDS-related illnesses. 70
Chief Judge Richard Posner wrote the opinion in this case, and
started off by stating:
The core meaning of [place of public accommodation], plainly
enough, is that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant,
dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility
(whether in physical space or in electronic space) . . . cannot exclude

67. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006).
68. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. But see Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, where Justice
Kennedy states that the use of “absurdity” to justify a result should be limited to situations
which are truly absurd, not just situations where an odd result may occur. 491 U.S. 440, 471–82
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20.
70. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
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disabled persons from entering . . . and . . . using the facility in
the same way that the nondisabled do. 71

The court stated that an insurance company and its policies are
“plainly” within the scope of Title III and neither the company nor
its policies can refuse to sell insurance to a person with AIDS. The
court also stated that if a company has a policy setting a cap on
AIDS-related illnesses that effectively excludes individuals with AIDS
from receiving the benefits of the plan, even without express
restrictions, that would still be an exclusion on the basis of a
disability under Title III of the ADA. The court found, however, that
the policy capping benefits for AIDS related illnesses did not have
such effect, as individuals with AIDS also had non-AIDS-related
medical needs and were given full and equal access to non-AIDSrelated coverage. 72
In Doe, the plaintiffs were essentially asking the court to regulate
the content of the insurance policy and coverage rather than the
access to the policy and coverage. The court ultimately held that the
plaintiffs’ Title III violation claim failed, as Title III regulates access
rather than content of services and goods. 73
Lastly, in 1999 the Second Circuit decided an insurance coverage
case: Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co. 74 The Second Circuit stated
that Title III guaranteed “more than mere physical access” 75 and that
it is not sufficient that an entity covered by Title III provide access to
its facilities if the entity still refuses to sell merchandise to an
individual on the basis of a disability. The court reasoned that the
statute’s use of the word “of” in “goods [and] services . . . of any
place of public accommodation,” 76 means that access is not limited
to goods and services “inside” a place of public accommodation. 77
Instead, the court reasoned, access extends to any goods and services

71. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). The court cited Carparts to support this proposition.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 554–55. Doe was appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court denied
certiorari. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 528 U.S. 1106 (2000). Unfortunately this does not
provide useful fodder for speculating about whether the Supreme Court approves of a broader
interpretation of Title III as Doe’s holding was limited to finding that Title III does not regulate
content of goods or services.
74. 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999).
75. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
77. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33.
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that the entity offers, irrespective of how they offer it. 78 The court
held that the company’s insurance policy itself may be a covered
entity under Title III and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 79

2. A website is a place of public accommodation
On June 19, 2012, in National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc.
(“Netflix II”), a district court in the First Circuit became the first
federal court to hold that a website, as a standalone entity—meaning
that the website itself was the only subject of the decision and no
physical selling locations, warehouses, or tangible goods were
implicated 80—was a place of public accommodation. 81 The suit,
brought by deaf individuals and advocates under Title III of the ADA,
alleged that Netflix did not provide equal access to its services. 82
Netflix is a video rental service that offers titles to subscribers
through its “Watch Instantly” service, where a subscriber selects
what title they would like to watch and the title is instantly streamed
from Netflix’s servers to the subscriber’s computer or device. 83 The
plaintiffs in Netflix II alleged that Netflix denied deaf subscribers
equal enjoyment and access to the streaming service by only offering
closed captioning on a small number of titles, effectively excluding
deaf individuals from access to the non-captioned titles. Netflix filed
a motion to dismiss on the basis that, among other things, its
website was not a place of public accommodation under Title III. 84
The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts denied Netflix’s motion, holding that Netflix’s
website was a place of public accommodation. 85 The court did not
establish a “nexus” between the website and an actual “brick-andmortar store” like other district courts have done in similar cases—
as discussed in Part III.B—but instead found that the website was
“analogous” to a brick-and-mortar store, such as a video rental store.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 37.
80. See infra note 95.
81. 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
82. Id. at 200–02.
83. See Matt Julington, Netflix Questions, SALON.COM, http://techtips.salon.com/netflixquestions-460.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
84. Netflix II, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
85. Id. at 200–02, 208.
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As the court was located in the First Circuit, the court cited to
Carparts for the proposition that a place of public accommodation
does not need to be an actual physical structure.86
Netflix filed a motion asking the judge to certify an interlocutory
appeal to the First Circuit, calling the judge’s decision “the broadestever extension of the ADA’s scope, thereby opening the door to
amorphous and seemingly limitless regulation of the Internet in a
way Congress did not envision and no other court has accepted.” 87
Netflix’s motion was denied because the judge found that the case
did not “present the exceptional circumstances justifying an
interlocutory appeal.” 88 After Netflix’s motion was denied, Netflix
entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs. 89 In the agreement,
Netflix agreed to caption most of its titles by 2014. 90
Netflix II has wide-ranging implications for this area of
jurisprudence. First, this decision potentially opens up all
commercial websites to suit under Title III. 91 Second, serious forum
shopping implications arise from this decision, as a nearly identical

86. Id. at 200–02 (quoting H.R. Rep. 101 485(II) at 108 (1990)). Netflix also argued that
it did not have control over which titles it could caption because of copyright issues, and
therefore it did not own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation under Title III. Id. at
202–03. The court disagreed with this argument, as Netflix did in fact own and operate the
website, but indicated that Netflix may be able to amend its argument to claim that it is not able
to caption the titles because of copyright issues in the future. Id. at 202–03. Netflix also made
the argument that its streaming service does not fall under Title III because its services were
accessed in private residences, not public spaces. The court found this argument unpersuasive,
stating that: “The ADA covers the services ‘of’ a public accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a
public accommodation.” Id. at 201. The court likened Netflix’s service to a pizza delivery service
which is ordered over the phone and enjoyed in a private home. Id. at 201–02. The court also
disagreed with Netflix’s argument that a recent regulation by the FCC, which set forth
captioning requirements for distributors of online video programming, preempted any Title III
requirements and mooted the plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 203–08.
87. Motion to Amend at 1, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., (2012) (No. 3:11-cv30168), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/DMassNtlDeafvNetflixDoc65.pdf.
88. Order Denying Motion to Amend, Docket No. 70, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix,
Inc., (2012) (No. 3:11CV30168).
89. Order Granting Motion to Approve Consent Judgment, Docket No. 87, Nat’l Ass’n of
the Deaf. v. Netflix, Inc., (2012) (No. 3:11CV30168).
90. Consent Decree, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., (2012) (No. 11-30168-MAP),
available at http://dredf.org/captioning/netflix-consent-decree-10-10-12.pdf.
91. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Will the Floodgates Open Up for Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) Claims Against Websites?—National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, TECH. & MARKETING
LAW BLOG (June 26, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/06/are_the_floodga.htm;
Julian Sanchez, The ADA and the Internet, CATO INST. (June 29, 2012, 4:43 PM),
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/the-ada-and-the-internet/.
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claim against Netflix was dismissed in 2012 by a district court in the
Ninth Circuit. 92 Although there is no explicit circuit court holding
that a website is a place of public accommodation, the stage is now
set for litigants who want to pursue Title III claims against
commercial websites without any direct connection to an actual
brick-and-mortar place of public accommodation.

B. The Narrow View: There Must Be a Nexus between the Good or Service
Offered and an Actual Physical Place
On the other side of the split, the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the plain language of Title III
requires a place of public accommodation to be a physical
structure.93 These circuits use the “nexus” test, which requires a
nexus between goods and services offered through nonphysical
means to a physical place of public accommodation. 94 Several district
courts in these circuits have held that a website as a standalone
entity 95 cannot be a place of public accommodation. But these courts
have held that a website may be subject to the ADA if a nexus can be
established between the website and a physical place. 96 While
plaintiffs bringing claims under Title III in these circuits have been
successful, some commentators believe that the narrow scope of the
“nexus” test does little to ensure that persons with disabilities will
have equal access to websites. 97 The storefront test, discussed in

92. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012). This case is discussed
in Part III.B.2.
93. See, e.g., Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1013–14 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We,
therefore, disagree with the First Circuit’s decision in Carparts . . . . To interpret [Title III] as
permitting a place of accommodation to constitute something other than a physical place is to
ignore the text of the statute.”).
94. See id. at 1011.
95. By using the phrase “standalone entity” I mean to describe websites that are only
websites, without any link to a physical selling location or warehouse, and without a connection
to any physical inventory. For example, Facebook is a website that does not (generally) have any
connection to a physical selling location, warehouse, or inventory. But Amazon.com would not
be a “standalone entity” as it has warehouses and physical inventory. See infra text accompanying
notes 195–96.
96. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
97. See, e.g., Ali Abrar & Kerry J. Dingle, From Madness to Method: The Americans with
Disabilities Act Meets the Internet, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134 (2009) (arguing that the
nexus test is “under-inclusive in that it fails to increase the accessibility of large-scale
commercial websites”).
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Part IV, expands upon the nexus test to provide broader Title III
protection.

1. Places of public accommodation are limited to physical structures and the
nexus test
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to hold that Title III only
applies to physical places. 98 In Stoutenborough, a group of hearingimpaired plaintiffs sued the NFL and the Cleveland Browns over a
“blackout rule,” alleging that the rule violated Title III of the ADA
because it denied the plaintiffs access to the football games through
communication technology. 99 The Sixth Circuit held that “the
prohibitions of Title III are restricted to ‘places’ of public
accommodation,” 100 and that an interpretation that Title III is not
limited to physical places “contravenes the plain language of the
statute.” 101 Under this interpretation of Title III, the court found
that the NFL and its teams were not places of public
accommodation. Although the NFL and its member clubs have
headquarters in a physical place somewhere, the court held that its
existence as a “league” is not subject to Title III as it is not itself a
tangible physical structure. 102
A few years after Stoutenborough, the Sixth Circuit decided Parker
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a case involving a long-term
disability plan offered by an employer and issued by an insurance
company. 103 The plan provided benefits for individuals with physical
disorders until they turned sixty-five but limited benefits for
individuals with mental disorders to twenty-four months. 104 The
Sixth Circuit, deciding the case en banc, upheld the district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an
eight-to-five decision. 105 The court found that the insurance plan

98. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 581–82.
100. Id. at 583.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
104. Id. at 1008.
105. See id. at 1008, 1014. It is worth noting that one of the dissenters in Parker disagreed
with the court’s holding that Title III only applies to physical structures and pointed out that as
business increasingly takes place over the phone or Internet, many disabled individuals will not
have the access that Title III would guarantee if the business took place in a physical facility. Id.
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was not a good or service of a place of public accommodation. 106 The
court noted that although an insurance office is expressly included in
Title III’s categories, 107 the plan was not offered from the insurance
office; instead the plan was provided by a private employer and
issued by an insurance company. 108 The court reasoned that a
member of the public could not have walked into the insurance
company’s office or the employer’s office to receive the policy that
plaintiff received. 109 The court then introduced the “nexus” test,
which is the requirement that there must be a nexus between a good
or service offered through a nonphysical medium and a public
physical facility. The court found that there was “no nexus between
the disparity in benefits and the services which [the insurance
company] offers to the public from its insurance office” as the public
could not enter the office to obtain the policy that plaintiff
received. 110
The Third Circuit became the next circuit to hold that Title III is
limited to physical places in Ford v. Schering Plough Corp. 111 Ford also
involved a long-term disability plan,112 and the Third Circuit held
that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title III because the
disability plan was not offered at a physical place of public
accommodation. 113 The Third Circuit, whose analysis resembled the
Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Parker, found that the policy was not
offered from the insurance company’s office, but from the terms and
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.114 The court found that,
because the plaintiff received the benefit as a condition of her
at 1020 (Boyce, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1014.
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006).
108. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
109. Id. at 1011.
110. Id. The court also expressly disagreed with the Carparts’s decision and the First
Circuit’s reasoning that “[b]y including ‘travel service’ among the list of services considered
‘public accommodations’” Title III was not limited to physical places. Id. at 1013 (quoting
Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19
(1st Cir. 1994)). The court observed that ‘travel service’ was used in the statute alongside a shoe
repair service, office of an accountant, an insurance office, and a professional office; and since all
of these places are physical, applying the canon of noscitur a sociis suggests that Congress
intended “travel office” to be a physical location. Id. at 1013–14.
111. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
112. Id. 603–04.
113. Id. at 614.
114. Id. at 612.
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employment, there was not a nexus since the disability benefit plan
was not offered from the insurance office. 115 The Third Circuit
supported its decision by comparing Title III to the Civil Rights Act,
whose similar language has been found to only apply to physical
places and not to organizations. 116 The court also pointed out that
confining Title III to physical places is consistent with the DOJ’s
regulations, which focuses on goods or services that are utilized by
access to physical places. 117
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a similar issue in Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 118 As in Parker and Ford, the
plaintiff in Weyer brought suit alleging that an employer provided
disability plan that provided greater physical disability benefits than
mental disability benefits violated Title III. 119 The Ninth Circuit
stated that to successfully assert a Title III claim, there would have
to be a nexus between the good or service and an actual physical
place. 120 The court acknowledged that an “insurance office” is a
place of public accommodation, but stated that the case was “not
about such matters as ramps and elevators so that disabled people
can get to the office.” 121 The court found that the plan was not
offered by the insurance office but was offered by the employer and
administered by the insurance company. Since there was no nexus
between the plan and the office, no Title III violation had
occurred. 122
115. Id. at 613. Another interesting note about Ford is that Justice Alito, who now sits on
the Supreme Court, took part in the decision. Unfortunately Justice Alito did not indicate his
position on whether Title III applies to physical places. He did not take part in the opinion but
wrote a separate, concurring opinion stating that he would uphold the lower court’s dismissal on
other grounds without reaching the more difficult Title III question. See id. at 615 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“I would not reach the more difficult issue[] of . . . whether Title III’s public
accommodation provision guarantees anything more than physical access. Th[is] issue[] ha[s]
divided the circuits, and I would reserve judgment until we are confronted with a case in which
the unique considerations of insurance plans are not at stake.”).
116. Id. at 613.
117. Id. The DOJ’s regulations specify that a place of public accommodation is a “facility,”
which is further defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes,
equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other
real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or
equipment is located.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
118. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
119. Id. at 1107–08.
120. Id. at 1114.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1114–15.
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In 2002 a plaintiff successfully recovered under the nexus test. In
Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, LTD., the Eleventh Circuit held that a
contestant hotline was subject to Title III. 123 Rendon involved an
automated telephone contestant selection process for a game show,
which required prospective contestants to call in and answer
questions by selecting a number on the telephone keypad. 124
Individuals with hearing disabilities and mobility impairments were
not able to participate in the contestant selection process because
either they could not hear the questions over the telephone, or they
could not move their fingers fast enough to enter their answers on
the keypad. 125 These individuals filed a complaint against the
producers of the show alleging that the selection process violated
Title III.126
The Eleventh Circuit began by establishing that the game show
itself took place in a place of public accommodation that would be
subject to regulation under Title III. The court recognized that this
case did not involve a physical barrier that prevented access to a place
of public accommodation but involved an “intangible” barrier that
prevented the plaintiffs from having the same access to the
opportunity to be a contestant that individuals without disabilities
had. 127 The court found that the plain language of Title III covered
both tangible and intangible barriers to places of public
accommodation such as eligibility criteria, policies, or procedures
that screen out individuals with disabilities. 128 The court held in
favor of the plaintiffs, reasoning that, although the automated
telephone screening process discriminated against individuals offsite,
it had a direct nexus to the studio. 129

123. 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
124. Id. at 1280.
125. Id. at 1280–81.
126. Id. at 1281.
127. Id. at 1283.
128. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
129. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1285 n.8. The Eleventh Circuit never explicitly stated that the
automated telephone system itself was not a place of public accommodation, however, the
court’s use of the nexus test to find a connection between the studio and the automated
telephone system strongly suggests that the court would not have found the telephone system
itself a place of public accommodation. Accordingly, most commentators place the Eleventh
Circuit on the narrow side of the split. See, e.g., Michael P. Anderson, Ensuring Equal Access to the
Internet for the Elderly: The Need to Amend Title III of the ADA, 19 ELDER L.J. 159, 176–78 (2011);
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2. Websites under Title III and the nexus test
The Eleventh Circuit became the first—and so far only—circuit
to face the question of whether a website itself can be a place of
public accommodation in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.130
The court also faced the direct question of whether an individual can
recover under Title III when they allege a nexus between a
discriminatory website and a physical place. 131 However, the
Eleventh Circuit disposed of this case without deciding these
issues. 132
Access Now involved a website operated by Southwest Airlines
that offered booking specials exclusively through its website. One of
the plaintiffs, a visually impaired individual, was unable to navigate
Southwest’s website and brought suit alleging that Southwest.com’s
inaccessibility violated Title III. 133 At the district court level, the
plaintiffs simply stated that Southwest.com itself was a place of
public accommodation without alleging a nexus between the website
and a physical facility. 134 The district court dismissed the case based
on its belief that—contrary to the plaintiffs’ assumption—
Southwest.com, as a standalone entity, was not a place of public
accommodation and that the plaintiffs failed to establish a nexus
between the website and a physical facility.135
On appeal, the plaintiffs apparently ditched the argument—or
assumption—that Southwest.com was a place of public
accommodation and “presented [the Eleventh Circuit] with a case
that [was] wholly different from the one they brought to the district

Stephanie Khouri, Disability Law—Welcome to the New Town Square of Today’s Global Village:
Website Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities After Target and the 2008 Amendments to the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 331, 343 (2010).
130. 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004).
131. Id. at 1329.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1325–26. The plaintiff tried to access the website and take advantage of its
online deals through a screen reader, but the individual was not able to gain access to the deals
offered through the website. Southwest.com did not label its graphics or make its online forms
navigable. Id.
134. Id. at 1326–27.
135. Id. at 1328. The district court found that “the plain and unambiguous language of the
statute and relevant regulations does not include Internet websites among the definitions of
‘places of public accommodation,’” and that to fall within the scope of the ADA, “a public
accommodation must be a physical, concrete structure.” Id. (quoting Access Now, Inc. v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002)).
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court.” 136 On appeal the plaintiffs argued that Southwest’s website
had a nexus to the physical facility of Southwest Airlines. 137 This
gave the Eleventh Circuit an opportunity to avoid both issues
because 1) the plaintiffs did not argue that the website itself was a
place of public accommodation as they had at the district court level
and 2) they brought a new legal theory to the appellate court that
they did not bring before the district court. The court was reluctant
to “wad[e] into the thicket of a circuit split on th[e] issue,” 138 and
stated that it should wait to address these important issues until
they are properly brought before them.139 Accordingly, the court
dismissed the appeal.140
Access Now is important because even though the Eleventh
Circuit did not state an opinion about whether Title III applies to
websites, the district court’s decision that a website itself is not a
place of public accommodation, and suggestion that a plaintiff may
be able to allege a nexus between a website and a physical place of
public accommodation, was not reversed. Recently, an Eleventh
Circuit district court held that an exchange network website for
timeshares existed only in “cyberspace” and was not a place of public
accommodation. 141 Another district court used some creativity to
put together a string cite that attributed the following proposition to
the Eleventh Circuit: “[T]he Eleventh Circuit has recognized
Congress' clear intent that Title III of the ADA governs solely access
to physical, concrete places of public accommodation.” 142 It appears
that courts within the Eleventh Circuit continue to hold that
websites are not places of public accommodation. 143
In National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., a district court in
the Ninth circuit became the first federal court to apply the nexus

136. Id. at 1326.
137. Id. at 1328.
138. Id. at 1334.
139. Id. at 1334–35.
140. Id. at 1335.
141. Steelman v. Florida, No. 6:13–cv–123–Orl–36DAB, 2013 WL 1104746, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 19, 2013).
142. Petrano v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:12–cv–86–SPM–GRJ, 2013 WL
1325045, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2013).
143. It is interesting, though, that the court in Steelman cited to Young v. Facebook, 790 F.
Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal 2011), a Ninth Circuit district court case, for the proposition that a
website is not a place of public accommodation. Steelman, 2013 WL 1104746, at *3.
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test to a website. 144 In Target, the plaintiffs brought a Title III suit
alleging that Target’s website was not accessible to individuals with
visual impairments. The plaintiffs claimed that the website was not
designed in a way that a screen reader could make sense of the
graphics, making it impracticable for a blind individual to navigate
the website. 145
Target filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
arguing that Title III only applies to physical places. 146 The plaintiffs
argued that there was a nexus between Target.com and Target
stores. 147 The court started by laying out the Ninth Circuit’s
position in Weyer that places of public accommodation under Title III
are limited to physical places. 148 The court then recognized that
other courts have allowed plaintiffs to allege a nexus between a good
or service and a place of public accommodation. 149 After laying this
foundation, the court disagreed with Target’s argument that Title III
only applies to onsite physical access, stating that Title III specifically
requires the removal of intangible and communication barriers that
limit access to goods and services of a place of public
accommodation, not in a place of public accommodation. 150 The
court distinguished Target from Stoutenborough by pointing out that
Target’s website was “heavily integrated with the brick-and-mortar
stores and operates in many ways as a gateway to the stores.”151
After comparing Target’s case to Rendon, the court found that, as in
Rendon, Target’s website prevented individuals with disabilities from
accessing the goods and services of a place of public
accommodation. 152
Because the plaintiffs successfully asserted a nexus between
Target.com and Target’s physical stores, the court denied Target’s

144. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
145. Id. at 949–50; see also supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 952. The plaintiffs argued that unequal access to the website denied them equal
access to the goods and services offered at Target stores. This appears to be the nexus argument,
but it is not clear if the plaintiffs actually alleged a connection between the website and a
physical store or if the court helped out the plaintiffs by assuming the argument.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 953.
150. Id. at 951, 953–55.
151. Id. at 954–55.
152. Id. at 955–56.
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motion to dismiss. 153 However, the court placed a substantial
limitation on this seemingly favorable ruling. The court granted
Target’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title III violation claims “[t]o
the extent that Target.com offers information and services
unconnected to Target stores, which do not affect the enjoyment of
goods and services offered in Target stores.” 154 Thus, the court
limited Title III’s coverage from reaching anything that was not
directly offered inside a store, including goods or services sold
exclusively online. The court ended up dismissing the claims of
plaintiffs who preferred to shop online 155 and even dismissed the
original plaintiff’s claim because he only used the website to “preshop” before he went to an actual Target store. 156
To successfully assert a Title III violation under Target, a plaintiff
must first assert a nexus between the website and a physical store
that offers the same exact goods or services to the public. Under
Target’s nexus test, online-only retailers who do not have facilities
open to the public, such as Amazon, are outside of the reach of the
ADA.
Several subsequent cases in Ninth Circuit district courts have
dealt with the issue of whether Title III applies to websites. Young v.
Facebook, Inc. involved a Title III claim where the plaintiff alleged that
Facebook’s failure to provide her with customer service
accommodations discriminated against individuals with mental
disabilities. 157 The district court conceded that Facebook’s
headquarters were in a physical space, but found that Facebook’s
services were only offered to the public in cyberspace and not at the
headquarters.158 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s argument that
Facebook.com, as a standalone entity, was a place of public
accommodation failed and the claim was dismissed. 159 In another
Ninth Circuit district court case, Ouellette v. Viacom, a plaintiff
153. Id. at 956.
154. Id.
155. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., No. C 06-01802, 2007 WL 1223755, at *4-5
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007).
156. Id. at 17.
157. 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
158. Id. at 1115.
159. Id. at 1116–17, 1119. The plaintiff also claimed a nexus between Facebook.com and
gift cards that Facebook sells in actual physical retail outlets; this argument failed because Title
III is limited to entities that own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation, and
Facebook did not own or operate any of these retail outlets. Id. at 1116–17.
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brought suit alleging that the removal of his videos from the Internet
violated Title III. 160 It is not clear what the plaintiff’s disability was
or why removal of the videos violated the ADA, but the district court
dismissed the claim on grounds that “neither a website nor its
servers are ‘actual, physical places where goods or services are open
to the public,’ putting them within the ambit of the ADA.” 161
Finally, a Ninth Circuit district court decided a case regarding
Netflix accessibility the same summer as the First Circuit district
court decided Netflix II. In Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix I”), a hearing
impaired individual brought a claim against Netflix alleging a Title
III violation that was nearly identical to the claim brought before the
First Circuit district court in Netflix II.162 The plaintiff in Netflix I
alleged that Netflix’s limited selection of shows with closed
captioning in its “Watch Instantly” service denied him equal access
to the titles. 163 The court acknowledged the decision in Netflix II
earlier that summer, but stated that under Ninth Circuit law a
website itself is not a place of public accommodation unless there is
a nexus between the website and a physical place. 164 Applying this
rule, the court held that Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” website was not
subject to Title III and dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim. 165
These district court decisions, along with the Netflix II court’s
decision, have resulted in a clear split on the issue of whether the
ADA applies to websites, albeit at the district court level only.
Although the circuit split is not as clearly or deeply entrenched at the
circuit court level, it is clear that a plaintiff may successfully bring a
Title III claim against a website in one court, and completely fail in
another. This discrepancy between the courts urges the need for a
clear, consistent, and workable guideline that provides ADA
protection in an intuitive way while staying within the bounds of the
text of the ADA.

160. No. CV–10–133–M–DWM–JCL., 2011 WL 1883190 (D. Mont. May 17, 2011).
th
161. Id. at *1 (quoting Weyer v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp.,198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9
Cir. 2000)).
162. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see supra, Part III.A.2.
163. Netflix I, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–22.
164. Id. at 1023.
165. Id. at 1024.
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C. Reconciling the Circuit Split

Several commentators and court opinions have discussed the
split between the circuits on the issue of whether Title III applies to
websites.166 I believe, however, that the split between the courts is
reconcilable at the circuit court level.
In Netflix II, The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that a website—as a standalone entity 167—is a
place of public accommodation while citing to First Circuit precedent
in Carparts. 168 However, it is not certain that the First Circuit would
have upheld the district court’s judgment on appeal if the case had
not settled. Although the language in Carparts plainly states that a
place of public accommodation is not limited to actual physical
structures, the actual analysis in the case focuses on access of
services or goods offered from a physical place through nonphysical
mediums like phone or mail. 169 It is possible that instead of standing
for the proposition that a place of public accommodation can be a
virtual place, the decision of the court in Carparts may have simply
lacked focus in its holding. 170 The First Circuit’s decision may more
precisely stand for the proposition that Title III requires access to
goods and services of a place of public accommodation.
The decisions in Doe and Pallozzi focus on nonphysical access of a
good or service rather than the physical or nonphysical nature of the
place of public accommodation offering the good or service. Even the
language in Doe about websites falling under Title III does not state
that a website itself is a place of public accommodation, rather, the

166. See, e.g., Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir.
2004); Anderson, supra note 129, at 170–81; Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 280; Michael O.
Finnigan Jr., Brian C. Griffith & Heather M. Lutz, Accommodating Cyberspace: Application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to the Internet, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795, 1812 (2007).
167. See supra note 95.
168. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200–02 (D. Mass. 2012).
169. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’
include providers of services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical
structure.”).
170. This lack of focus would be understandable because, even though the World Wide
Web was somewhat developed by 1994, it is unlikely that the First Circuit contemplated a
nonphysical entity (such as a website) offering access to a good (such as a movie) through
nonphysical means.
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court’s statement that “[t]he core meaning of this provision . . . is
that the owner or operator of a . . . Web site . . . cannot exclude
persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility
in the same way the nondisabled do,” 171 refers to a website as a
means of access to a facility. Pallozzi also limited its holding of Title
III regulation to “the sale of insurance policies in insurance offices,”
stating that Title III does not merely regulate access to the office
itself, but the goods and services inside the office, no matter how
they are accessed. 172 This language does not clearly lead to the
proposition that a service offered in a nonphysical place—i.e.,
cyberspace—is a place of public accommodation. In light of Doe and
Pallozzi’s more focused decisions, it is possible that the First Circuit
might clarify and narrow the scope of its decision in Carparts to focus
on access of a physical place through a nonphysical medium if given
the opportunity. 173
The Second and Seventh Circuits’ focus on Title III’s application
to nonphysical access of a physical place is nearly identical to the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Title III forbids “intangible barriers”
to physical places. 174 Doe and Pallozzi involved plaintiffs who were
allegedly denied equal enjoyment of insurance plans offered by an
insurance office through policies, which had the disparate impact of
discriminating against individuals with certain disabilities. 175
Likewise, Rendon involved plaintiffs who were allegedly denied equal
access to an opportunity to be on a game show through procedures
that had the disparate impact of screening out individuals with
certain disabilities. In these three cases the three courts held that
such procedures violated Title III.
The split becomes more reconcilable upon observation that the
Sixth, Third, and Ninth Circuits’ holdings in Parker, Ford, and Weyer
(respectively) were based on the reasoning that the insurance
171. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added).
172. Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
173. In fact, a district court within the Seventh Circuit recently declined to answer the
question of whether Title III applies to non-physical entities. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Ill. High
Sch. Assoc., No. 12 C 3758, 2012 WL 3581174, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2012). The court did
not even cite to Doe, instead citing to the Third Circuit Ford case and a district court case
decided prior to Doe. Id. Perhaps district courts within the Seventh Circuit will continue to step
away from the broad interpretation of Title III that is often attributed to the Seventh Circuit.
174. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods. Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002).
175. See supra, Part III.A.1.
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policies were not actually offered from the insurance office. 176
Although these circuits may have explicitly disagreed with decisions
by circuits on the broad side of the split, the disagreement actually
was about whether the policies were offered from the insurance
office itself, rather than a difference in Title III interpretation. Thus,
the holdings did not turn on a broad or narrow interpretation of Title
III but on the application of Title III to the facts. The analysis in the
decisions by the courts on both sides of the split actually appears
very similar: First, they recognize that the insurance is a good or
service. Next, they ask whether the policies of the insurance plan
prevent access to a good offered at a place of public accommodation,
which is essentially the nexus test. Finally, their decisions differ on
whether the place the plans allegedly deny access to is a good or
service of the insurance office itself or a product of an agreement
that is not offered from the insurance office.
In summary, the circuits involved in this split do not explicitly
differ on the question of whether Title III applies to a nonphysical
entity. 177 The “narrow” circuits have explicitly held that Title III
does not apply to a nonphysical entity while the “broad” circuits
have not held otherwise. The circuit courts involved in this issue
seem to agree that Title III prevents discrimination through
intangible barriers to a physical place, whether onsite or offsite, and
the only difference is that the “narrow” courts call this the nexus test
while the “broad” circuits do not have a name for it. The circuit
courts even employ similar analysis to determine whether the alleged
discriminatory goods or services are covered under Title III. 178
Although the split between the circuits is reconcilable, a workable
solution is needed, as this split has manifested itself in an
irreconcilable way at the district court level.

176. See supra Part III.B.
177. It is also important to note that the First Circuit did not hold that the Wholesalers
Association of New England and the health plan’s administrating trust was a place of public
accommodation in Carparts. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994); see also supra Part III.A.1. This means that Carparts
is not in direct conflict with Stoutenborough, which held that an organization—i.e., the NFL and
its club teams—was not a place of public accommodation. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football
League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995).
178. Even the First Circuit, which stated that Title III is “not so limited” to actual physical
structures, followed this pattern of analysis in Carparts, stating that Title III regulates goods and
services offered through intangible means—over the phone for example—even if they do not
deny actual physical access to a place. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20.
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IV. THE STOREFRONT APPROACH: CONSTRUING THE ADA BROADLY
WHILE STAYING WITHIN THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
The storefront test is a new solution, which has not been
previously considered, to the problem of applying Title III protection
to websites. The storefront test proposes the following:
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a
substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical facility
may be subject to Title III if the facility and the website together
form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the
enumerated places of public accommodation.

The storefront test builds upon the nexus test to extend Title III
coverage to a variety of websites, including online-only retailers,
while remaining true to the text of the statute.
The first section of this Part establishes the textual boundaries of
Title III and concludes that Title III does not cover websites as
standalone entities 179 but may cover websites operated by places of
public accommodation. The second section of this Part explains the
storefront test in depth and illustrates its utility as a workable
standard for a wide variety of websites.

A. The Plain Text of Title III Does Not Apply to Websites as Standalone
Entities
Any solution that applies Title III to websites must stay within
the textual bounds of the ADA. In order to provide the maximum
amount of Title III protection it is necessary to establish the
boundaries of the text of the ADA. The plain text of Title III does not
support a solution that applies Title III to nonphysical places, but the
text is able to extend coverage to goods or services offered by a
physical place through nonphysical means.
It is well established that “the starting point for interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” 180 The plain text of Title III, as
discussed in Part II.B, clearly does not list a website as a place of

179. See supra note 95.
180. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see
also United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).

680

DO NOT DELETE

651

1/29/2014 4:30 PM

Wheelchair Ramps in Cyberspace

public accommodation. 181 Although Congress has stated its intent
that the entities listed within the categories be illustrative and that
liberal interpretation be given to the categories, 182 none of the
entities listed within the categories is sufficiently analogous to a
virtual place to allow a website to fall under one of the “catchall’”
terms at the end of the categories. 183 It does not matter that a
website offers the same goods or services as those listed in the
categories; the website itself is an entirely different entity that is not
covered under the plain language of Title III. Outside of the statute,
the DOJ’s regulations do not contain any language that extends the
ADA to cover nonphysical virtual places. The regulations define a
place of public accommodation as a facility, and define a facility by
listing characteristics that are clearly physical in nature. 184 The
courts and the DOJ are barred from creating a new category that
might be analogous to virtual places because Congress has stated
that the categories enumerated within Title III are exhaustive. 185
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA does not indicate
that Congress intended the ADA to apply to websites. Early drafts of
Title III simply referred to “any public accommodation” rather than
“place of public accommodation.” 186 The term “place of public
accommodation” was inserted into later drafts of the ADA,
apparently—according to one of the original drafters of the ADA—
because Congress wanted the ADA’s coverage to be similar to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 187 This addition suggests that Congress
intended to limit Title III to physical places. As the Third Circuit
pointed out in Ford, the Civil Rights Act has clearly been limited to
181. See Finnigan, supra note 166, at 1826 (concluding that “the language of the ADA does
not allow Title III to apply to the Internet”).
182. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, at 100 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 383;
see also S. REP. NO. 101-16, at 59 (1989).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).
184. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (“Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures,
sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways,
parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property,
structure, or equipment is located.”); see also supra Part II.B.
185. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 100; see also S. REP. NO. 101-16, at 59.
186. On
the
Threshold
of
Independence,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
ON
DISABILITY,
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1988/Jan1988#9a2 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013) (emphasis
added) (providing the first draft of the ADA as proposed by the National Council on Disability);
see also H.R. 4498, 100th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2d Sess. 1988); 134 CONG. REC. 5110 (1988); 134
CONG. REC. 1307 (1988).
187. See Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 285.
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actual physical places and has been held not to cover such
nonphysical entities as memberships in organizations. 188
General statements of legislative intent, such as the intent
codified in section 12101(b) of the ADA, which states that the ADA
is intended to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities,” 189 certainly lend support to an argument that Title III
should apply to private websites as standalone entities.
Unfortunately, these general statements fail to clearly indicate that
Congress intended (or would intend) Title III to apply to websites.
One indication of legislative intent may be found in Congress’s
failure to amend Title III of the ADA to clearly apply to websites
when Congress amended the ADA in 2008. 190 As the question of
whether Title III applies to private websites was well established by
the time of the amendments, Congress’s silence on the issue may
speak louder than any statements of general legislative intent that
the ADA should be interpreted broadly.191
As neither the plain text nor the legislative history indicate that a
website is a place of public accommodation, a solution that applies
the ADA to private websites would be inappropriate if it simply
stated that any private website is subject to Title III. As the district
court in Access Now stated, “[t]o expand the ADA to cover ‘virtual’
spaces would be to create new rights without well-defined
standards.” 192
Despite Title III’s textual limitations, the ADA may still be used

188. Ford v. Schering Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998).
189. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 382 (explaining that Congress intends for the ADA to “bring individuals with disabilities
into the economic and social mainstream of American life . . . in a clear, balanced, and
reasonable manner”).
190. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §2, reprinted in 2008
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553; see also supra Part II.A.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. Some commentators have suggested that if
Congress were to regulate private website accessibility for individuals with disabilities, Congress
might not even do it through Title III of the ADA. See Finnigan, supra note 166, at 1820-21; Kelly
E. Konkright, An Analysis of the Applicability of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Private
Internet Access Providers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 713 (2001); see also supra Part II.A (noting that claims
that a website violates the ADA are not brought under Title IV as the FCC has no authority to
regulate the Internet).
192. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317 (S.D. Fla.
2002)).
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to reach private websites. Title III clearly prohibits places of public
accommodation from denying access to their facilities through
intangible barriers. The statute prohibits eligibility criteria; policies,
practices, or procedures; and communication barriers that prevent
access to a facility’s goods or services. 193 Websites operated by
places of public accommodation may fall under any one of such
barriers—especially “communication barriers”—that prevent access
to a facility’s goods or services; it appears that every circuit court
that has addressed this issue would agree that a website can be a
barrier within the meaning of Title III. 194 Therefore, Title III may be
used by courts to regulate certain websites without falling outside of
the bounds of the ADA.
The nexus test is likely the best way to reach private websites
through the ADA, after some modifications. Although some courts
have limited the scope of the nexus test—to wit, Target—the nexus
test can be modified in a way that provides Title III protection to
individuals with disabilities and reaches online-only retail
establishments through the “storefront” test.

B. The Storefront Test: A Broader Version of the Nexus Test, Which Protects
Individuals with Disabilities While Conforming to the Text of the Americans
with Disabilities Act
The storefront test builds upon the nexus test, which has been
criticized for being overly narrow, 195 and expands on the nexus test
to include any website that serves as an access point to goods or
services of an enumerated place of public accommodation. The
storefront test (or rule) is as follows:
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a
substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical facility
may be subject to Title III if the facility and the website together
form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the
enumerated places of public accommodation.

193. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(i)–(iv) (2006).
194. E.g., Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods. Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Title
III covers both tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers . . . and intangible
barriers, such as eligibility requirements and screening rules or discriminatory policies and
procedures that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services
and privileges.”); see also supra Part III.
195. See Abrar, supra note 97, at 184.
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This approach will enable courts to reach online-only retail
establishments without overstepping the boundaries of the text of
the ADA.
The nexus test distinguishes between websites that provide access
to a place of public accommodation from websites that are
standalone entities. A website that is a standalone entity, offering
goods and services through a nonphysical virtual place, is not subject
to Title III. A website that merely provides access to a good or
service of a physical facility may be covered under Title III. Using the
Target court’s narrow application of the nexus test, the nexus test
applies to websites operated by sales and rental establishments that
have physical facilities open to the public, such as Wal-Mart,
Blockbuster, Best Buy, or even smaller specialized retail stores such
as the Apple Retail Store. However, under Target, coverage of the
ADA only extends to goods or services on the website that are
offered in the retail stores themselves, precluding online-only
products, specials, and offers. 196 The nexus test likewise extends to
any other entity listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), such as a hotel,
movie theater, or insurance office, as long as the products and prices
offered online are the same as those offered inside the facilities
themselves. So while the nexus test does extend Title III to some
websites, plaintiffs will not be able to state a Title III claim if the
good or service they are attempting to access is not actually offered
in a physical facility that is open to the public.
The storefront test expands on the nexus test by extending Title
III to any website that acts as a mere storefront to an entity that
offers a substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical
facility, if together the website and the facility would fall under one
of the enumerated places of public accommodation. Under the
storefront test it does not matter whether the facility is open to the
public. If the website provides access to goods or services offered
from a physical facility, such as a warehouse, then the website acts
as a storefront to the warehouse and together they are considered a
sales facility. The storefront approach considers the website as an
extension of the physical facility. If the goods and services are offered
from a physical facility and the website is merely a means of
accessing the goods or services of that facility, and if considered
together the website and the facility form an entity that is
196. See supra Part III.B.2.
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enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), the website will be subject to
Title III. It is necessary, however, that the goods or services must be
offered from the physical facility, and not solely from the website,
such as a software download or a social networking service that
takes place exclusively over the Internet. The storefront test would
also extend to goods or services that are online-only offers of an
establishment that is open to the public, such as Target, because the
goods or services are still offered from a physical facility via the
website.
To illustrate the storefront test, consider Amazon, an online-only
retailer that does not offer products to the public from a physical
facility except through its website. Amazon has warehouses and
distribution centers located throughout the world. 197 When a
customer orders a product from Amazon.com, the product, which is
located inside one of Amazon’s warehouses or distribution centers,
is pulled from the shelf and shipped to the customer. 198 Amazon’s
website is merely a means of accessing the goods offered from the
warehouses, a tool that allows customers to browse the “aisles,” put
items into their “shopping carts,” and pay for the goods. This is
essentially the same thing a customer does when patronizing WalMart—the goods come from a distribution center, are stored
somewhere within the store, stocked on the shelves, and the
customers browse around, place items in their shopping carts, and
pay for the items at a checkout lane—except Amazon’s customer
does not physically enter a facility to shop. Under the storefront test,
if goods or services are offered from a physical facility—that is, if you
were to visit one of the facilities for which the website serves as a
storefront and find the goods or services that are offered online
there—then the facility is the place where the online goods or
services are offered to the public and the website merely serves as
the means by which customers access the products offered from that
place. Thus, under the storefront test, Amazon and other online-only
sales establishments that offer their products from a physical facility

197. Global Locations, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/b/?node=239366011 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2013).
198. Spencer Soper, Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, MORNING CALL (Sept. 18, 2011),
http://articles.mcall.com/2011-09-18/news/mc-allentown-amazon-complaints20110917_1_warehouse-workers-heat-stress-brutal-heat; Matt Stopera, What it Looks Like Inside
Amazon.com, BUZZFEED (NOV. 28, 2011), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mjs538/what-it-looks-likeinside-amazoncom.
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would be subject to Title III.
The storefront test borrows language from Young v. Facebook,
where the same Ninth Circuit district court, which narrowly applied
the nexus test in Target, found that Facebook.com was not subject to
Title III because, “Facebook only operates in cyberspace” and “[w]hile
Facebook’s physical headquarters obviously is a physical space, it is
not a place where the online services to which [the plaintiff] claims she was
denied access are offered to the public.” 199 Under the storefront test,
Facebook.com would not be subject to Title III because Facebook’s
online social networking services take place in cyberspace. A visitor
of Facebook’s facilities might find web designers and programmers,
and may even find the servers from which Facebook operates, but it
will be impossible for a visitor to see or interact with his or her
social network simply by visiting the facility (unless, of course, the
visitor is on a computer or smartphone). Thus, while Facebook may
be developed from a physical place, its services are offered
exclusively from its website. This distinguishes Facebook from
Amazon, which offers the goods from a warehouse that the website
provides access to. Thus, while Amazon’s website is merely the way
that customers access the goods and services that are offered from a
physical facility—a storefront—Facebook’s website is the location
where services are offered.
To be successful in a Title III claim under the storefront test, a
plaintiff alleging a Title III violation by a website will have to make
the same showings he or she would have to show under a typical
Title III claim.200 The biggest difference under the storefront test is
that a covered entity, such as a sales or rental establishment, would
be subject to Title III whether it has a physical storefront or a virtual
storefront that is open to the public. Under Title III, covered entities
would not be required to make accommodations to their websites if
they are not readily achievable, would result in undue burden, or
199. Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal 2011) (emphasis
added); see also Ouellette v. Viacom, No. CV–10–133–M–DWM–JCL, 2011 WL 1883190, at *1
(D. Mont. May 17, 2011) (“[N]either a website nor its servers are actual, physical places where
goods or services are open to the public, putting them within the ambit of the ADA.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
200. To be successful in a Title III claim the plaintiff must show: 1) the plaintiff has a
disability and is subject to discrimination; 2) the accused party is a private entity that affects
commerce; 3) the party owns, operates or leases a place of public accommodation as enumerated
in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) and; 4) the plaintiff was denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods or
services on the basis of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
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would fundamentally alter the nature of their goods or services. 201
Additionally, a facility that operates a website may be able to make
alternative methods of accessing the goods available through the
auxiliary aids such as a phone number where an individual can call
to access the goods or services, or an alternate text-based website for
individuals who use a screen reader. 202
As the storefront test is subject to the textual limitations of Title
III, there would be several websites that offer goods or services
online that would not be covered. Facebook is one example of such a
website; another example would be a small company that offers
computer software for download. Although the company may have a
headquarters somewhere where the products are developed, the
products are only offered from a virtual space. Thus, the website is
not a mere storefront for the product, but is the whole store.
Another important limitation would be a small online-only boutique
that offers only a few homemade goods out of an individual’s home.
The storefront approach determines what type of “place” the entity
is by viewing the website as an extension of the facility that offers
the goods or services. Whereas a warehouse that offers a variety of
goods to the public through a website (acting as the storefront to the
warehouse) would be a “sales establishment” under Title III, 203 an
individual that offers a limited selection of goods out of their home
through a website would not qualify as a sales establishment. While
the website might serve as a means of accessing the goods, the
individual offering the goods out of his or her home would not be
subject to Title III any more than individuals selling homemade
goods to the public directly out of their home (not through a
website) or offering piano lessons from their home. These
limitations assure that the storefront test is in compliance with the
text of the ADA and prevents the storefront test from becoming
over-inclusive and burdensome.
The requirement that a facility operating a website must offer a
substantial amount of its goods or services from the physical facility is
an important element of the storefront test. This serves both limiting

201. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(i)–(iv).
202. See id. 12182(b)(2)(iii), (v); Anderson, supra note 129, at 183.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E).
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and expansive functions. It limits Title III from reaching an onlineonly entity, such as Facebook, that may also sell T-shirts online.
Even if Facebook’s T-shirts sold well, no one would consider
Facebook a T-shirt company. Therefore, a substantial portion of
Facebook’s goods or services are only offered from a virtual location.
This would place Facebook outside of the reach of Title III even if
Facebook offered a few goods from a physical location. On the other
hand, Amazon offers books for digital download from its virtual
website. While such a good, standing alone, would not be subject to
Title III under the storefront test, Amazon offers a substantial
amount of its goods from a physical facility. Because Amazon offers a
substantial amount of its goods from a physical location, its digital
goods would also be subject to Title III.
The analysis of the “substantial amount of goods or services”
element of the storefront test would be more nuanced if it were
determined that Amazon devotes a significant portion of its business
operations to digital book sales, or that customers make as much use
of the digital goods as the physical goods. Netflix is a great example
of such a business. Netflix offers both a “Watch Instantly” service
and a mail order DVD service from the same website. It would be
difficult to decide which of Netflix’s services is more “substantial,”
as both services are so widely used that Netflix had at one-time
considered splitting the two services into separate businesses. 204
Netflix’s mail order DVD service would clearly fall under Title III
based on the storefront test, as the goods and services are offered
through a physical rental establishment via the Internet; Netflix’s
“Watch Instantly” service, however, would not be covered by Title III
under the storefront test, as its services are offered exclusively
through a virtual, nonphysical website. Under the storefront test,
Netflix’s website would be regulated similarly to wholesale
establishments that make goods available to the public.
The wholesale establishment exception was promulgated by the
DOJ to preclude wholesale establishments that sell goods exclusively
to other business from Title III coverage. 205 If the wholesale

204. Brad Tuttle, Qwikster Split: The Real Reason Netflix Broke in Two, TIME BUS. & MONEY
(Sept. 20, 2011), http://business.time.com/2011/09/20/qwikster-split-the-real-reason-netflixbroke-in-two; see also Stu Woo, Under Fire, Netflix Rewinds DVD Plan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203499704576622674082410578.html.
205. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. C at 206.
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establishment decides to make some goods available to the public,
then only the portion of the wholesale establishment that is made
open to the public would be subject to Title III. 206 Similar to the
wholesale establishment exception, Netflix’s streaming service
would not be subject to Title III while Netflix’s online mail order
service would be covered by Title III. 207
Although there will be some websites that will be outside of the
reach of the ADA under the storefront test, this limitation is
necessitated by the plain text of the statute. The storefront test
pushes the ADA to its textual limits, providing Title III protection to
206. Id.
207. Cf. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011–12 (6th Cir. 1997)
(analogizing the wholesale establishment exception and carve-out provision to an insurance plan
offered solely through a business’s employee health insurance program and an insurance plan
offered to the public).
An interesting question arises when considering how the storefront test would apply to the
service that Amazon offers between vendors and individuals putting up items for sale on
Amazon, and how Amazon, the vendors, and the individuals would be dealt with under the
storefront test. Note that this service is offered on the same website that Amazon uses for its
own sale of goods. First, a determination would be made about whether Amazon’s service
between vendors constitutes a substantial amount of Amazon’s overall goods or services. If this
service was only minor, as in the example of Facebook’s T-shirts, then Amazon’s service
between vendors would be subject to the ADA to the extent that Amazon as a whole would be
subject to the ADA under the storefront test. But if Amazon’s service between vendors was
determined to be substantial, as I believe it would be, then Amazon’s service between vendors
and individual sellers would be analyzed separately from Amazon’s own retail services. This
service, which connects vendors and individual sellers to buyers, is offered entirely through
cyberspace, with no actual connection to a physical location. Thus, Amazon’s exchange service
would not be subject to the ADA under the storefront test. A district court located in the
Eleventh Circuit actually addressed the question of whether an online timeshare exchange
network was subject to the ADA and found that the exchange network was not subject to the
ADA because “[p]laintiff has sued an entity that is service-based, rather than property-based,
and exists in ‘cyberspace,’ but is not ‘a place of public accommodation.’” Steelman v. Florida,
No. 6:13–cv–123–Orl–36DAB, 2013 WL 1104746, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2013). As for the
individuals selling goods through Amazon’s exchange service, the individuals would not be
subject to the ADA as noted supra text accompanying notes 198–200. Whether vendors would be
subject to the ADA under the storefront test is a much more interesting question. If a vendor
selling items through Amazon’s exchange service is an actual retail establishment with a
physical location where they either sell goods to the public from that location or store and ship
out goods to customers through online sales, it would appear that Amazon’s exchange service is
the storefront for that vendor. The storefront test requires, however, that “the facility and the
website together form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the enumerated places of
public accommodation.” The vendor and Amazon’s exchange service, together, do not form an
entity that would subject the vendor to the ADA under the storefront test any more than a
vendor at a flea market would be responsible for the hosting facility’s ADA compliance.
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many more websites than the current nexus test (as applied by the
Target court) while staying within the bounds of the statute. The
storefront test also reconciles the split between the circuits without
favoring one circuit’s decisions over the others’. While the storefront
test is not a substitute for legislation, it would allow the courts to
ensure that individuals with disabilities are provided with equal
access to websites that offer goods or services from a physical facility
while adhering to judicial principles of prudence.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined the problem presented by websites
that are inaccessible to individuals with disabilities and offered a
new solution that would place many websites within the ambit of
the ADA. A circuit split has clearly manifested itself at the district
court level on the issue of whether Title III of the ADA covers
websites. Although the plain text of Title III does not provide
protection for individuals against discrimination by private websites,
the storefront test would enable courts to extend Title III protection
to websites while staying within the bounds of the text of the
statute. The storefront test builds upon the narrow nexus test by
considering the function of the website together with the nature of
the physical facility offering the goods, expanding Title III coverage
to online-only retailers, among other websites. Although there are
websites that would still be outside the reach of Title III, a judicial
rule cannot fully regulate the new and vast frontier of the World
Wide Web. New legislation is needed. In the meantime, the
storefront test is a practical and workable solution that logically
extends Title III coverage to websites without overstepping judicial
bounds.
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